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We consider the impact of delegation in a Cournotic duopoly with differentiated goods 
upon the firms’ profit maximization behavior. In an oligopoly, delegation in each firm 
can be modeled through a specific non-cooperative game. Delegation games in a 
differentiated goods market with affine demand are studied within the Cournot 
competition concept where redelegation is permitted in a symmetric duopoly. The 
following results are demonstrated: The maximand delegated by each primary 
delegator, i.e. owner of each firm, converges in monotonically decreasing fashion to 
the true profit function in the absence of delegation costs, and total industry output at 
the Cournot equilibrium converges in monotonically increasing fashion to some output 
level. Welfare changes due to redelegation are also considered.
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Games, Cournot Competition, Bertrand Competition, Duopoly, Differentiated Goods, 
Principal-Agent Games, Nash Equilibrium.
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Farklılaştırılmış mallar üreten bir “Cournot” rekabetçi düopoldeki delegasyonun, 
firmaların kar maksimizasyonu davranışı üzerindeki etkisini incelemekteyiz. Bir 
oligopolde, firmalar içindeki delegasyon özel bir işbirliksiz oyunla modellenebilir. 
Simetrik bir düopol kapsamında, afin talepli bir farklılaştırılmış mal piyasasında, 
yönetici atamalarına izin verilmesi durumunda “Cournot” rekabetçi delegasyon 
oyunları İncelenmektedir. Su sonuçlar sergilenmektedir: Her firmadaki firma sahibi gibi 
ilksel yetkilendirici tarafından belirlenen amaç fonksiyonu delegasyon giderleri 
yokluğunda monoton azalarak gerçek kar fonksiyonuna, endüstri boyutunda üretilen 
toplam “Cournot” denge miktarı monoton artarak bir üretim düzeyine yakınsar. 
Tekrarlanan delegasyon sonucunda ortaya çıkan toplumsal refah değişimleri de 
İncelenmektedir.
ANAHTAR SÖZCÜKI.ER; Delegasyon, Etkinlik, Firma Teorisi, Regülasyon, 
İşbirliksiz Oyunlar, Cournot Rekabet Modeli, Bertrand Rekabet Modeli, Düopol, 
Farklılaştırılmış Mallar, İşveren-İşçi Oyunları, Nash Dengesi.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In microeconomic theory, firms are generally treated as agents with sole 
objective of profit maximization. Many economists have argued this as simplistic and 
claimed that the relations between managerial processes within a firm should also be 
considered to determine the true behavior of a firm.
The objective of a large corporation may deviate from the maximization of 
profits. The complicated decision processes in the corporation and separation of 
ownership and management may be reasons for deviating from profit maximization. 
That can cause the firms to be interested in maximizing revenues, market share or 
another objective related to those rather than profits and to have market power as their 
ultimate goal.
In the case of entry deterrence in a single good industry, in which a monopoly 
is producing and selling its products through profit maximizing behavior and which is 
threatened by an outside firm with entry, the latter firm will not be deterred. However, 
if the monopoly hires managers who maximize revenues and the action of the 
managers are announced, the entrance of a profit maximizing firm will be deterred. 
Although the underlying non-cooperative games are different in both situations, the 
monopoly which has managers maximizing the market share gains more profit than the 
classical duopolistic firm (Vickers (1985)). Hence utility maximizers do not indeed 
directly maximize utility but may still attain highest utility possible.
Hence the consideration of separating ownership and management from each 
other may be a good starting point of stressing this type of behavior. Within large firms 
forming an oligopoly in a single good market, the separation of ownership and 
management gives the owner the opportunity not to directly maximize firm’s profits. 
The behavior of the manager totally dependent on the owner’s and his rival managers’ 
in the other firms may then reflect a totally complicated action, i.e. profit maximization 
based on a fictitious marginal cost assigned by the owner.
Another complicated question arises when the number of managers vertically 
delegated increases: What will the behavior of the owners be? How far will they 
deviate from profit maximization? For the homogeneous good market such studies
have been done through redelegation schemes by Koray - Sertel (1989a, 1989b, 
1989c).
The main aim of this study can be summarized as demonstrating the behavior 
of owners and managers in a delegation game if redelegation of managers in each firm 
is permitted in a duopolistic differentiated goods market with a certain maximand type 
delegated to each manager in Cournot competition concept.
I.l. A SURVEY ON DELEGATION LITERATURE
Such a delegation scheme is literally adopted by Vickers (1985). He first 
stresses that in the case of entry deterrence, a non-profit maximizing firm may gain 
more profits than a profit maximizing firm under certain circumstances. The scenario 
Vickers uses is a two-stage game in a duopoly or n-firmi oligopoly in which in the first 
stage owners simultaneously select the managers’ incentives and in the second stage 
the managers endowed with the maximands delegated by the owners simultaneously 
choose outputs of firms accordingly, i.e. they maximize profit functions of firms with 
fictitious costs determined by the owner. The case where the good market has an affine 
inverse demand and the firms have the same constant marginal cost is analyzed. 
However, outcomes of the game are not incentive compatible. Furthermore, the results 
show that quantity competition under delegation ends with lower profits, higher 
outputs and lower price for each firm than competing in ordinary Cournot fashion with 
an objective of direct profit maximization. In.this scenario the managers hired do not 
receive any share from the profits of the firms but they have fixed wages.
Later study by Fershtman and Judd (1987) analyzes incentive contracts that 
owners will choose for their managers in an oligopolistic concept, focusing on how 
competing owners may strategically manipulate these incentive contracts and the 
resulting impact on the oligopoly outcome, introducing both quantity competition in a 
similar homogeneous good market with Vickers’ maximand and price competition in a 
differentiated goods market with the same maximand. In the analysis they follow, 
firms with different constant marginal costs compete in a market with random linear 
demand. The randomness in the parameters of the demand is handled by taking the 
expected value of those and does not essentially change the method of analysis so that 
the decisions of managers remain the same as the case where the demand function is 
deterministic.
Sklivas (1987) deals with similar principal-agent games and further shows that 
in a differentiated goods market, duopolistic firms gain more profits as a result of price 
competition version of the owner-manager game than the ordinary Bertrand 
competition. Firms behave as profit maximizers with marginal costs more than the true 
cost, with the result that prices are higher than in the ordinary Bertrand game. It is also 
stated and proven that in a quantity competition version of owner manager game in a 
homogeneous good market, what firms produce is greater than the ordinary Cournot 
output and less than the socially efficient amount. Here, firms behave as profit 
maximizers with marginal costs lower than the true cost. In price competition in the 
owner-manager game in a differentiated goods market firms produce total output less 
than ordinary Bertrand level but more than the joint profit maximizing output 
(collusive case).
Koray and Sertel (1989a) develop the idea of redelegation in such an industry. 
By vertically redeiegating new managers in the firm working with similar objectives 
that are dependent upon the incentive assigned by the manager above in the 
hierarchical chain where redelegation is assumed to be costless and by using the idea of 
improvement in the welfare in one manager delegation in quantity competition, they 
show that a regulatory mechanism can be imposed to improve the welfare in an 
oligopoly where information about marginal cost is private to each firm. This 
regulation is based on a method called as "Pretend-But-Perform" mechanism (PPM) 
and one delegation of it has the same subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the game 
between owner and manager adopted by preceding economists. Another result Koray 
and Sertel propose is that in a m-firm oligopoly, the total output produced in the 
industry converges to the socially efficient one with the rate m  ^ which was m in the 
ordinary Cournot game. So this scheme of Pretend-But-Perform resulted with m^-m 
fictitious firms in the industry. Viewed this way, the m firms end up with producing the 
output load of firms, each firm producing the load of m copies of itself and m-1 of 
these fictitious firms. This brings to our attention another point, namely the number of 
market participants m. Under ordinary free entry, Cournot equilibrium with uniform 
setup costs Co, let the equilibrium size of the industry be m*. For the free entry 
equilibrium number m’ ending up actually producing positive output in their 
declaration and PPM, we have m’^ >m*>m’ except the situation (m’,m*)=(l,2), while 
output with firms m’ regulated by PPM is at least as large as that produced m* firms
under ordinary free entry Cournot equilibrium. Hence PPM enhances regulation in an 
oligopoly.
Koray and Sertel (1989b) show that the one-delegation equilibrium concept in 
Vickers, Fershtman-Judd and Sklivas is unstable, and each principal has an incentive 
to redelegate, increasing the length of the delegation chain if decreasing the manager 
number already delegated is not permitted. When we consider the scenario in which if 
one owner redelegates then the second owner is obligated to redelegate because of the 
decrease in his profits arising otherwise, delegating only once is not a stable 
equilibrium. No manager in one firm and two managers in the other is a stable 
equilibrium as proposed by Koray and Sertel. However, another possibility is to 
increase the length of manager chain without bound, in this case, the industry-wide 
output at the Cournot equilibrium under delegation in the homogeneous good market 
converges in monotonically increasing fashion to the socially efficient one and the 
maximand delegated by each owner converges in monotonically decreasing fashion to 
the true profit function, the fictitious cost parameter goes to the true marginal cost in 
the limit i.e. the primary incentive parameter converges to 1. This outcome is also 
incentive compatible contrary to Vickers’ one manager delegation. Now though it may 
seem paradoxical that as the length of the delegation chain increases, the owners 
exaggerate their efficiency less, yet the output gets larger. The efficiency (incentive 
parameter) assigned to the last manager who chooses the firm’s output is still greater 
than 1 and converges to 3/2 as the manager chsin grows beyond bound. More formally 
it is equal to 3(n+l)/(2n+3), where n is the number of managers in the chain.
The dimension that the above studies introduce leads to the following question: 
To what extent can the VFJS (Vickers, Fershtman - Judd, Sklivas) theory be 
considered as a work of Positive Economic Theory? Three problems arise with the 
theory. First, we can not restrict the managers to compete in quantity or in price in 
positive theoretic sense. They will want to qompete in most profitable fashion. Second, 
the maximand type can not be restricted to a certain one i.e. Vickers’ maximand, 
owners can find a more profitable maximand. Indeed Koray and Sertel (1989c) find 
such maximands. Finally one delegation equilibrium is unstable and for stability firms 
should redelegate.
1.2. CRITIQUES TO VFJS THEORY
Vickers, Fershtman - Judd, Sklivas theory on delegation equilibria can not be 
considered as positive theory in many respects. If the managers of each firm are free to 
choose their competition type, i.e. in quantity or price, why will they choose to 
compete in Cournot fashion or why should the owners of the firms instruct them to do 
so? For example, in the differentiated goods market competing in price is more 
profitable as stated by Sklivas (1987). So it is wise for both owners to let their 
managers compete in Bertrand way. Unless a regulatory or dictatorial scheme imposes 
them to compete in Cournot fashion, price competition is better for each firm in 
economic sense. If any other type of competition resulting with more profits is found, 
this will be even better for each firm.
Another aspect that VFJS fails to explain is why the managers are restricted to 
the given maximand type, i.e. a linear combination of revenues and profits. Any other 
maximand yielding non-zero profit can be chosen as the objective. Especially, if the 
profits of firms are higher under the new maximand than the maximand given by VFJS, 
it will be wise for the owners to hand it down to their managers. Hence not limiting the 
maximand space to contain only the maximands specified by VFJS will be right in 
positive theoretic sense. The space of possible outcome quantities can allow many 
types of quantity competition with different maximands. Throughout our analysis, we 
take the maximand types restricted to Vickers’ maximands (a linear combination of 
profit and revenue) and approach to the problem as one in economic design in an 
oligopoly instead of positive theoretic approach. Two further examples of other 
maximand spaces are given by Koray - Sertel (1989c).
The third problem regarding the delegation equilibrium concept is why to limit 
the delegation chain to one link. Kcray - Sertel (1989b) show that this is unstable, 
since delegating to one more manager is more profitable for the owner than keeping 
the number of managers the same as his rival. We face with infinite delegation as one 
of the stable Nash equilibrium possibilities. If there are redelegation costs, then the 
chain will end up with a finite number of managers. However, the space of possible 
stable chain lengths also includes finite chain lengths in the absence of redelegation 
costs: One owner does not hire any managers and the other exactly hires two.
So approaching the problem as an economic design problem connected with 
some central planning mechanism is more realistic. Our study is an extended work on
redelegation game in a duopolistic differentiated product market with quantity 
competition using the recursive delegation equilibrium concept (Koray - Sertel 
(1989b)). We have the theoretical set-up of VFJS and Koray - Sertel. Section II 
presents some illustrative examples and the basic model to analyze the differentiated 
goods market with symmetric firms. Section III presents the whole analysis of 
considered game forms with the ordinary Cournot competition, one-step delegation 
game in quantity and redelegation game of infinite length manager chain. We use a 
mathematics software package in analyzing that part in order to predict the behavior of 
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome in several-step delegation and give the 
computer program in the appendix. That section demonstrates our main result, i.e. the 
maximand delegated by the owner to the top manager approaches to the true profit 
function in monotonically decreasing fashion. In the last part of Section III we 
demonstrate changes in social welfare due to redelegation, and try to explain to what 
extent the design can be a regulatory mechanism.
n . SOME ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
As a starting point to the concept of delegation, the entry deterrence in a 
monopolistic market can be considered in Vickers’ (1985) fashion. Firm A is deciding 
whether or not to enter a market currently monopolized by firm B. If A enters, B’s 
managers must decide whether to respond aggressively or in an accommodating 
fashion. Entry is profitable for A if and only if B does not fight. In case of entry, B will 
profit more if it accommodates and not fights, and B’s profits are greater if there is no 
entry still.
Two types of behaviors of the managers can be seen:
1) B’s managers are concerned to maximize profits
2) B’s managers are principally concerned to maintain their dominance over the 
market. Profits are in the second place.
In the first case entry will occur and it will be accommodated, since B will not 
be able to fight due to its managers’ behavior. In second case entry will be deterred 
since A’s managers will know B will fight since market domination is B’s managers’ 
primary concern, so knowing this A will not enter. Hence profit maximizing behavior 
will lead to less profits for firm B than the mixed strategy behavior of managers of B 
which has market dominance in mind in the first place.
Let the inverse demand be given by P=a-x. Assume entry involves payment of a 
sunk cost F^ . Suppose firm B is already in the market and managers maximize 
ttb+GbXb; a combination of profits and sales volume. Let c be the common constant 
marginal cost in each firm. Entry is profitable for firm A only if 0B<a-c-3F. Entry is 
deterred if this does not hold. Firm B’s profits are higher than non-deterring profits if 
((a-c)L0B^)/4>(a-c)^ / 9. So choosing 0b in that way results with higher profits for firm 
B. Therefore entry deterrence by non-profit maximizers can be profitable if 
a-c>3F>(a-c)(l- Vs/3).
Since our model is partially based on Sklivas’ (1987) work, we can refer to his 
analysis as an insightful example. He examines a duopoly in which the firms, each 
having one owner and one manager, play a two-stage principal-agent game. In the first 
stage owners simultaneously write and publicly announce the contracts with their
managers. In the second stage the managers simultaneously choose their firms’ output. 
Owners receive the resulting profits and managers are rewarded according to their 
contracts but do not receive any share from the profit. Application of the Nash 
equilibrium concept to both stages results in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. The 
performance of the manager of firm i is measured by a linear combination of the firm’s 
profits Ttj and its revenue Rj. So the duty of the manager is to try to maximize his 
performance. So he chooses his firm’s output x; to maximize gj.
gi = Xi7Cj(xi,X2) + (1 - Xi)Ri(X],X2)
= Ri(xi,X2) - XiC(xj) i=l,2
The owner of firm i simply chooses the incentive parameter ?ij| to determine the 
manager’s maximand in firm i.
Definition 1: (x i’", X2’*') is Nash equilibrium output pair in managers’ (agents’) 
subgame if and only if xj* = argmax gi(xj, xj*) for {i,j}=(l,2}.
Deilnition 2: X2 *) ’s Nash equilibrium outcome in owners’ (principals’)
subgame if and only if X\*=argmax 7ii(xi’‘'(Xi, Xj’“), X2’'‘(^ i> ^j*)) for {i,j}=(l,2).
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome is the market outcome 
(x1*(Xi ’'‘,X.2*X^2*(^1*’^ 2*))> the Nash equilibrium quantities in the managers’ 
subgame that result from the Nash equilibrium incentives of the owners’ subgame.
Sklivas considers both quantity competition (Cournot) in a homogeneous good 
market and price competition (Bertrand) in a differentiated goods market versions of 
the same game.
Quanaty Competition: Let the inverse demand function be P = a - b x and 
total output be given with x = xi + X2 , the sum of the firms’ outputs in the market, 
and let the marginal cost for each firm be the same and constant. Tor the sake of 
simplicity let this cost satisfy c = 1. Let a > c = 1 for positive output production.
in the managers’ subgame, manager i's best response function (|)i(xj,Xj) is found 
by maximizing gj over xj. And best response function of the owner i is found by 
maximizing %[ over given that xi”" is determined by his manager in terms of X.j. So it 
is found that
xj = (a-X,j-bxj) / (2b) = (l)i(Xj, Xi),
Xi* = (a-2Xi+Xj) / (3b),
and this gives the Nash equilibrium quantities of the managers’ game as a iunction of 
(Xi, X2). As owner i makes his manager more aggressive by decreasing X.i, his own 
firm’s output increases while his rival’s decreases if the latter does not follow the 
former in doing so. The profit functions are given by
7Ci(Xi,Xj) = (M+Xi(6-a-X,j)-2X,j )^ / 9b, where M is given by 
M=a^-3 a-3 A,j+2aX,j+A,j^ .
So the owners’ best response functions are found as 
Xi=(6-a-Xj) / 4.
In this market what Sklivas finds is that the Nash equilibrium incentives are determined 
through X[* = (6-a) / 5 <1, i.e. the owners make their managers fight (which means to 
behave aggressively) in the market. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium output is 
found as
xj*(X.l*, %2*) = 2(a-l) / (5b), and this is greater than 
xj»(l,l) = (a-l)/(3b)
which is the ordinary Cournot output per firm. The price 
P(x j’'‘(X.1’'‘,^2*)>^2*(^1*»^2*)) ’S lower than the naked Cournot price. Finally the 
profit per firm is lower than the ordinary Cournot profit. The reason why owners hire 
managers is simple. If one firm hires a manager and the other does not, the profit of the 
manager hiring firm will exceed its Cournot profits and that of the non-deviating firm 
will decrease below the Cournot level. The reason why owners play such a game is the 
same as the simple Prisoners’ Dilemma: There are two prisoners and they are 
threatened to confess their guilt. If one cheats and says that the other is the criminal, 
he will not be punished and , the one claimed to be guilty will be punished strictly. But 
if both cheat, they will both be punished. So both prisoners cheat at Nash equilibrium. 
Cheating corresponds here to hiring a manager and not cheating corresponds to 
competing by direct profit maximization without any delegation.
Price Competition: In the case of symmetric product differentiation where the 
market has an affine demand function and firms have constant marginal cost c, Sklivas 
considers the price competition version of the owner-manager game. And this will be 
the set-up of the model that we will consider later.
Demand function for firm i’s output is given by an affine function 
xi = a  - Pi + Ppj, where 0 < p < l ,  {i,j}=(l,2}
and 0 < c < a  / (1-ß) for positive quantity production, where p; is the firm i’s , pj is firm 
j ’s price, Xi is the output produced by firm i.
Manager i's best response function \[/i(pj, Xj) is found by maximizing gj over p^ . 
By increasing X,j owner i makes his manager less aggressive, i.e. he responds with a 
greater pj for any pj:
'lfi(Pj.^i) = (ct + + Pjß) / 2 = Pi
The Nash equilibrium prices as a function of (Xi,X2)
Pi* =(2a + 2A,ic + aß  + ßX.jc) / (4-ß^)
When Xi varies, both prices move in the same direction. This yields the profit function 
7ri(Xi,Xj) = K + Xi (2aß\+aß^c+ß^c^Xj-6ß^c"+
ß'‘c"+8c^+Xi^(2ß^c^-4c^)) / (4-ß^)^ 
with K = (2a + aß  + Xjßc) (2a + aß + ßXjc-4c+ß^c)
So Nash equilibrium incentives are given by
Xi=(2aß^+aß^+ß-\jc-6ß^c+ß^c+8c) / c(8-4ß^),
Xi*=(2aß^+aß"-6ß^c+ßV+8c) / c(8-4ß^-ß^).
So in the owner-manager game, firms that compete in prices behave less aggressively 
than profit maximizers, i.e. Xi*>l. This results with higher prices than the Bertrand 
model i.e. Pi*(Xi*,X2*) ^ Pi*(i>l)· The consequences of the separation of ownership 
and management reverse under price competition; firms act as profit maximizers with 
fictitious marginal costs greater than true ones, resulting in higher prices in this model. 
Firms also receive higher profits than the Bertrand model case. Firm I ’s unilateral 
deviation from profit maximization raises both firms’ profits, commitment has a 
cooperative effect on the price competing duopoly, so firms earn higher profits but still 
less than the perfectly collusive case. The next section presents the delegation model 
adopted by this study using Vickers’ maximands.
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ill. THE MODEL
Our model considers a duopoly with symmetric firms in a differentiated goods 
market with affine demand for each firm. For the sake of compatibility, we assume that 
the form of the demand is the same as Sklivas’. If we state it once more for notation 
convenience:
X. = a  - Pi + Ppj ,where 0 < P < 1 for {i,j}={l,2), 
and a  / (1-P) > c > 0 for positive amount of output production, pi is the price of 
output of i’th firm, pj is the price of the output o fj’th firm, x; is the output of i’th firm, 
and c is the constant marginal cost of both firms. We examine the Cournot competition 
concept in this market to see whether Sklivas’ (1987) results for the behavior of 
owners in a homogeneous good market hold for our case.
m .l .  COURNOT COMPETITION
Here we use the ordinary Cournot model for the duopoly. We assume that the 
two firms in the market are competing for quantity in direct profit maximizing fashion. 
Here there are no managers in the firms buf owners decide the quantity in each firm by 
themselves. Inverse demand function for each firm is given by 
Pi =  ( a ( l + p ) - X i - p X j ) / ( l - p ^ )  for (i,j)=(l,2}.
Definition 3: The quantity pair is Nash equilibrium output of the
Cournot competition if and only if X[*-argmax 7Ci(xi,Xj*) for (i,j}={!,2}.
Given this definition best response function of i’th firm is 
(j)i(xj) = [a(l+P)-Pxj-c(l-p^)] / 2 = Xi.
So the Nash equilibrium output of the ordinary Cournot competition is 
Xi* = [a(l+P)-c(l"P^)] / (2+P), resulting with the price 
Pi* = [a+c(l-p')] / [(2+P)(l-P)] for i-1,2.
III.2. DELEGATION GAME
Using the same market framework, we can wonder what will happen if the 
owners delegate only one manager. They will play a two stage non-cooperative game 
called the owner-manager game. In the first stage owners simultaneously write 
managers’ contracts and using these contracts managers maximize their maximands 
and choose the decision variable of the game, output of the firm in which they work.
1)
Here information is assumed to be perfect however, the marginal cost of the firm is 
private to the owner and the manager of it. Managers are assumed to work with a fixed 
wage, and do not receive any share from the profit of the firm. The profits of firm i can 
be written as:
Tti = Pi Xi - c Xi and revenue;
Ri = Pi Xi.
We restrict the maximand of managers to gi = X.i Tti - (1 - Ri = pi Xi - A-i c Xi 
Using definition (1) and definition (2), best response function of manager i can be 
written as
4)i.i(xj> ^i) = [a(l+3)-3xj-M l-P^)] / 2 = Xi for {i, j}=(l,2), 
and Nash equilibrium output of managers’ subgame is determined as
= [a(2-P)(l+P)-2>,iC(l-PVXjCP(l-P")] / (4-P") for {ij)={1.2).
The higher the value of X·,, the less output is produced in firm i, and more is produced 
in the rival firm j. Note that Xi*(l,l) is nothing but the naked Cournot output.
Owners take this value and maximize their objectives over their incentive on 
their managers. Best response function of the owners can be written as
<l>o,i(^ j) + N] / 4c(P^-2)(l-|3^) = ili ,where N denotes
N = -2(l+p)(4-P") - 2pa{2-P)(l+P) - 2c(l-P")(4-p") - a(4-p')(2-p)(l+p) for
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium incentive is found as 
X,* = - [ap"+2c(p-l)(p+2)] / [c(P-l)(p^^2,a-4)], 
with output Xi* = - 2[(l-i-p){(P-l)c+a}] / (P^-2P-4), 
and price pi* = - [2cP^+ ap^- 2c - 2a] / [(p-l)(p^'-2p-4)] for (i,j}={l,2}.
Staiernent 1: In the owner-manager game managers behave more aggressively 
than profit maximizers i.e. Xj* < 1, i=l,2. This results with higher outputs, lower prices 
than the ordinary Cournot model.
Proof: The fact A,i*=A,2*<l follows from a  / (1-p) > c > 0, and A.i*==A,2* < 1 
implies Xi*(A-i*,A,2*) > Xi*(l,l), since the effect of a higher A,j dominates the effect of 
higher A,j so that the output which is a decreasing function in X·, decreases with respect 
to previous level, for i=l,2. Then prices are directly lower than the ordinary Cournot 
model.
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When profits are calculated, it is seen that these are lower than the usual 
Cournot level. Note that this is just the converse of the result found by Sklivas(!987) 
for price competition version of the game in the same market, and it supports his result 
for the quantity competition version for a homogeneous good market.
The intuition for the seemingly paradoxical result of profit maximizing owners’ 
committing their managers to non-profit maximizing behavior lies in the fact that 
delegating one manager against the sole owner in the rival firm results with higher 
profits than without delegating a manager but solely competing a’la Cournot.
m .3. REDELEGATION EQUILIBRIUM
Now consider the scenario in which duopolists have permission to redelegaie, 
i.e. to hire other managers vertically in any chain length. At the same manager number 
already hired for both firms, Koray - Sertel (1989b) show that in a homogeneous good 
market principals have an incentive to redelegate. This means that unilateral deviation 
for firm i causes it to profit more and the rival to profit less than the previous level. For 
the case where firms have no managers, we have demonstrated that principals have an 
incentive to delegate. Similarly at any level of managers, it can be proven that 
principals have the incentive to redclegate one more, if decreasing manager chain 
length is not permitted. Unilateral deviation by delegating one more manager than the 
rival increases the firm’s own profits again.
This meta-Cournotic gam*e has n+1 stages, where n is the number of vertically 
hired managers. In the first stage, the owners, as usual, simultaneously write down and 
announce the incentive parameters A,j,o for i=l,2. In the second stage, the managers at 
the first link of the chain simultaneously maximize the maximands of their own 
determined according to the incentive parameters assigned by the owners and 
determine the incentive parameters A,;.] for i=l,2, which is assigned to the managers at 
the second link of the chain. So in the k’th stage where l<k<n+l, the managers at the 
(k-l)’th link of the chain simultaneously maximize their maximands and determine the 
incentive parameters Ai,(ic.i) for i=l,2 according to the incentive parameters Ai,(k-2) for 
i=l,2 assigned by the managers above. Finally in the (n+l)’th stage, the managers at 
the n’ th link of the chain simultaneously determine the outputs of their firms according 
to the incentive parameters Ai,(n-i) for i=l,2 assigned by the managers at the preceding 
link of the chain. The objective of the owner of i’th firm for i=l,2 is profit 
maximization;
g i ,0 = TCi = (p i - c) Xi.
The maximand of the k’th manager in i’th firm for i=l,2 is given by 
gi,k = (pi - i^,(k-i) c) Xi for each k e (1, ... ,n}.
Deisnstion 4: (X;*,X2*) is Nash equilibrium, output pair of (n+l)’th stage in the 
redelegation game if and only if xi*=argmax gi,n(xi,xj*) for {ij}={i,2}.
Deiinition 5: (A-i,k*,X.2,k*) is Nash equilibrium incentive parameter pair of 
(k+l)’th stage in the redelegation game if and only if 
Xi.k* = argmax gi.k(xi*(^ i,k,A.j.k*),Xj*(A.i,kAj,k*)) 
for each k e (0, ... ,n-l} and for (i,]}=={!,2}.
Hence (xi*(/\-i,o*,^2,o*),X2*(k],o*,k.2,o*)) is the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium output pair of the game. Note that delegation is assumed to be costless 
throughout the analysis.
For n=l,2,3,4 the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium incentive parameter 
delegated by owner i, namely for n=0,l,2,3,4 output x;, price pi and profit TCi are 
demonstrated through a m.athematics software package XMAPLE (See appendix for 
computer program at list 1 and for graphical demonstrations at graphs 1 to 5). Note 
that the case n=0 corresponds to the naked Cournot competition. In these graphs the 
specific case for ar-l and c=l are considered. We see that the output per firm increases 
(graph 2), price of each firm’s product decreases (graph 3), profit per firm decreases 
(graph 4), and primary incentive parameter increases (graph 1), but still stays below 1 
for each P g (0,1), as the length of manager chain increases with equal number in each 
firm. The rate of decrease or increase for each item decreases in each redelegation. 
This fact creates the idea that in the limit they will converge to some specific value. 
Now we can make some comments on these graphs. P is the parameter of market 
differentiation. At P=l, the market characterizes a constant demand for each price 
level. The effect of both firms’ pricing cancel each other. Since the firms have the 
objective of attaining highest utility possible, they assign the price +oo. At 3=0, the 
market splits into two markets with completely differentiated goods, i.e. different 
goods. Hence each firm behaves as if it were the monopoly in its industry. Hence 
delegating managers have no effect on the profits, prices and output. The owners 
already assign ?w,o=l for i=l,2 at 3=0 for any manager length. The form of ki,o for 
i=],2 at a manager length n seems to be dependent upon 3 such that as 3 gets closer to
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1, the owners make the managers fight so aggressively that they behave as if the 
marginal cost were close to -oo. However, as n increases, the market should have a 
higher ß than the previous case to have extreme levels of aggressive behavior occur. 
Following deduction has been stated but has not been proven.
Statement 2: (Xi,o*A2,o*), the Nash equilibrium incentive parameters of the 
first stage of the meta-Cournotic game of (n+1) stages where n denotes the number of 
managers in each firm can explicitly be written with following functional form:
{aß-’' +c{ß -  \)[ß^”
c{ß -  0^(«)
(g/?^ ''+c(/?-l)g(n)}
c{ß- \ ) {ß^ ' ' - g{n) }
if  n is even
if  n is odd
i=l,2
where polynomial g(n) is defined by
2n-I
g(n) = E (-l)irj/2 )l^nM22n-j
j^ O
and with coefficients hj,„ satisfying for each j s  {0,1,... ,2n}.
=
y^-l.n-1 +^y-2,n-l 
1
0
i f  7 = 0 
i f  7 = 1
i f  j  is even and In  > / > 0 
i f  j  is odd and In  > j  > \ 
i f  n is even and j  = In
if  n is odd and j  = In
Note that, the polynomial g(n) satisfies the inequality g(n)>(3^" if n is odd and g(n)<0 if 
n is even.This statement still requires proof and it is only a deduction yield from the 
forms of the function in hand for manager chain lengths of n=0,l,2,3,4. We have not 
proven it, but it seems that induction on n can be a correct way of proof Proofs in the 
following statements are done assuming that above statement is true.
Statement 3: The owners make the top-manager behave less aggressively but 
still aggressively as the length of the manager chain increases, and in the limit, the
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primary incentive parameter converges to 1, i.e. the Nash equilibrium pair of incentive 
parameters (A,i,o*,X.2,o*) of n+1 stage meta-Cournotic game satisfies
(i) h,o* = A-i.o(n) < 1
(ii) Xi,o(n) > A,i,o(n-l)
(iii) lim A,i,o(n) = 1, for i=l,2.
n-^oo
Proq/!’^ i,o(n)=A,2,o(n) < 1 directly follows from g(n) > if n is odd and 
g(n)<0 if n is even, and a  / (1-P) > c. X.j,o(n) > Xi,o(n-l) ,and as n-> oo, X,i_o(n) l^ are 
direct consequences of statement (2) and, since g(n) does not become zero in its 
domain and does not make X.j,o -co for i=l,2. Note that, although the primary incentive 
parameter converges to 1, the last incentive parameter delegated on the industry floor 
does not converge to 1, hence output level does not converge to the ordinary Cournot 
quantity.
Statement 4: The maximand delegated by the owner to the top-manager 
converges in monotonically decreasing fashion to the true profit function.
Proof: This fact follows from lim ?ii,o(n) =1. So lim gi,i(n) =
n->o0 n->aO
lim (pi Xi- A,i,o(n) c Xi) = %i for i=l,2. Now A-i,o(n) converges in monotonically
n->00
increasing fashion to 1. So gi,i(n) converges in monotonically decreasing fashion since 
it is a decreasing function in Xi,o(n).
At this point, it will be wise to consult to the study done on the same market 
framework for Bertrand competition case by Yildirim (1995). He works on the same 
redelegation game within the Bertrand competition framework. The functional form of 
incentive parameters delegated by the primary delegator to the secondary delegator is 
studied. What Yildirim finds is that the incentive parameter is just symmetric of the one 
we find above, around X.i,o=l for i=l,2 i.e. the primary incentive parameter in the 
Cournot model approaches from below to 1 and the primary incentive parameter in the 
Bertrand model approaches from above to 1 as the length of chain increases without 
bound.
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Statement 5; the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium output pair of (n+1) stage meta-Cournotic game, where n denotes the 
number of managers is given for i =1,2 by
Xi(n) = Xi* = ([ f(n)(l+P)] [a - (l-P)c] }/ [f(n+l) + pf(n)]
where f(n) = Z (-1) " kj,n 2"'^  P ^
j"0
and with the coefficients kj,n satisfying for each j e (0,1,2,... },
=
0 if  j  is odd or j  > n
1 i f  y  = 0} or {j is even and n = j}
i f  j  is even and j > 0
This is also deduced by the help of the computer outputs and still requires proof We 
have the conjecture that this value is convergent as number of managers increase. 
m .4. COMPARISONS REGARDING SOCIAL WELFARE 
In this subsection we demonstrate the impact of delegation on social welfare. 
First, we should give the definitions of consumers’ and producers’ surplus in a 
differentiated goods industry to define the social welfare in our context.
Defmition 6: Consumers’ surplus in the differentiated goods industry at an 
output level (xi,X2) is defined by
2 Xi
CS(xi,X2)= 2  i  (pi(xi’,xj)-pi(xi,xj))dxi’ = I  Xi^  / (2(l-p^)),
j=l,2 and j?ii
i=l
producers’ surplus at output level (xi,X2) is defined by sum of profits in the market,
2 2
PS(xi,X2) = z  Tti(xi,X2) = Z (a(l+p)xi-Xi^-pXjXi-c(l-P^)xi}/(l-P^).
i=l i=l ami j;ii,j=l,2
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Welfare in the society can be some increasing function of both producers’ and 
consumers’ surplus, since it indicates aggregate utility function of the whole society. 
Many ways of defining welfare are possible. We further assume that welfare of the 
society at output level (xi,X2) is defined by sum of the producers’ and the consumers’ 
surpluses:
W(Xi,X2) = PS(Xi,X2) + CS(Xi,X2).
We assume that the society as a whole have decided on it, but not only the central 
planner or authority who deals with welfare maximization.
Definition 7: The quantity pair (xi’|^ ,X2*) is the socially efficient output level if 
and only if Xi* = argmax W(xi,xj*) for {i,j}={ 1,2}.
Socially efficient outcome per firm is determined as
Xi = (a-c(l-P)}(l+P) / (1+2J3), for i=l,2 in our market.
For welfare, the graph for a=2, c=l are demonstrated in appendix as welfare 
differentials in each delegation vs. P (graph 5) and social welfare for each delegation 
(graph 6). If we consider that graph, we see that the welfare does not uniformly 
increase or decrease on each delegation, but it is dependent on the degree of market 
differentiation p. It can be proposed that there exists some P^(n) g (0,1) such that the 
difference in welfare between each delegation
AW(n) = (W(x](n),x2(n))-W(xi(n-I),x2(n-1)) 
is positive for all P e (0,p^(n)) and negative for all P g (p'(n),l). Certainly the value of 
P^(n) is dependent on the value of equilibrium outputs for the delegation length n. 
However, for large manager lengths the welfare differential stays around zero for small 
values of p. Furthermore, for each manager length the output produced gets the same 
value with the socially efficient one for some p. Hence, the welfare attained by the 
concerned manager length is the highest one for that p. (For special case n=4, see 
graph 7). The analytic expression of this P as a function of delegation length can also 
explicitly be demonstrated in a further study. Hence welfare is equal to the socially 
efficient one at this p. So we can propose that, there exist certain market 
differentiation rates such that by delegating the enough number of managers, we can 
attain the highest welfare possible. So it can characterize a suboptimal regulatory 
mechanism. Such a regulation mechanism can include following steps:
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1) Using the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept in non-cooperative 
games, determine the number of managers that provide the welfare closest to the 
efficient one,
2) Impose the owners to compete in that manager length.
Statement 6: As number of managers increases without bound in the meta- 
Cournotic game, the industry-wide output level is convergent and converges in 
monotonically increasing fashion to some output level. The limit output is different 
from the socially efficient one.
This statement again needs proof and it is only a conjecture on the behavior of 
the output forms in the game. Hence if this result is true, infinite delegation game can 
not be used as an optimal regulatory mechanism for each P for improving welfare with 
respect to the ordinary Cournot competition in a duopoly. This may be source for a 
further study on this concept. Note that the proposition stated by Koray-Sertel (1989b) 
for a homogeneous good market impfies that the output level converges in 
monotonically increasing fashion to the socially efficient one. Hence this does not hold 
for a differentiated goods market. However our earlier statement saying that the 
primary incentive parameter converges to 1 is also valid for the homogeneous good 
market as stated by Koray-Sertel (1989b).
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main contribution of this study is to gain some further understanding about 
delegation in a market and to display the behavior of delegators. We demonstrate the 
behavior of owners and managers in a duopolistic market in the presence of 
differentiated goods. The meta-Cournotic competition concept in a differentiated 
goods market is rather different than the naked Cournot competition. However the 
redelegation game has not a pure Cournotic equilibrium for only the last managers are 
competing in quantity, but not the intermediate delegators. So the type of the game is 
determined by only the last manager on the industiy floor. Hence the preferences and 
the award contract of the last manager is important in deciding whether the firm should 
compete in quantity or price. In our study, we take the competition type to be limited 
to quantity and the preference of each delegator to a particular maximand type. The 
contracts of the managers are such that they do not receive any share from profit of the 
firm i.e. the labor market for managers is highly competitive and there exist many 
managers to do the job perfectly with some fixed wage. It is also important that the 
marginal cost of each firm is constant. If it were not, the meaning of the incentive 
parameter would not be exactly the same with our case where we take it as a fictitious 
cost coefficient. Also if the firms were not symmetric i.e. they had different costs or 
technologies in producing the good, the existence of equilibrium would arise as an 
important question.
First, results of the ordinary Cournot competition in the differentiated goods 
market are demonstrated. Second, one-manager delegation game is modeled with the 
concept of Cournot competition and results for homogeneous products are shown to 
be compatible with results of this study; The owners make the managers behave 
aggressively. Later, the recursive delegation is studied through the limiting behavior of 
owners. It is important that when the manager chain grows beyond bound, the 
maximands delegated by the owners of firms converge to the true profit function, 
hence the mechanism converges to an incentive compatible one. Price of good and 
profits of each firm monotonically decreases, output per firm monotonically increases 
in each delegation, and both are convergent in the limit. Regarding welfare, there exists 
only one P for each value of a  and c, such that social welfare converges to the socially
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efficient one. So the infinite delegation enhances regulation for those markets only. 
However, in contrast to the homogeneous good case, the infinite delegation 
equilibrium concept may not be used as a regulatory scheme for all values of the 
market differentiation rate p. Since the social welfare concept as defined in our study is 
not a monotonie function in P, the total industry output does not converge to the 
socially efficient one. However, there exists some P g (0,1) for each delegation length 
such that the equilibrium pair of outputs gives the highest attainable welfare in the 
society. These finite delegation lengths can be used in designing a suboptimal 
regulatory mechanism.
The framework presented throughout the study can be a basic theoretic setup 
to design regulation mechanisms for certain oligopolistic structures i.e. the varying 
marginal cost or different marginal cost for each firm, or markets with more 
complicated demand behavior. A further study may also try to prove the statements 
stated throughout the preceding sections and to determine P where the socially efficient 
welfare value becomes the same with the welfare attained by the particular finite 
delegation length.
2)
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APPENDIX
Graph 1. Incentive parameter X.j,o(n) vs. P for delegation lengths 1,2,3,4 for 
a=2, c=l.
Graph 2. Quantity produced in each firm Xj(n) vs. P for delegation lengths of 
0,1,2,3,4, fora=2, c=l.
Graph 3. Price of each firm pj(n) vs. P for delegation lengths 0,1,2,3,4, for 
a-2, c=l.
Graph 4. Profit of each firm 7tj(n) vs. P for delegation lengths 0,1,2,3,4 for 
a=2, c=l.
Graph 5. Difference in social welfare in each delegation AW(n) vs. P for 
delegation lengths 0,1,2,3,4 and efficient one for a=2, c=l.
Graph 6. Social welfare in each delegation W(n) vs. P for delegation lengths 
0,1,2,3,4, and efficient one for a=2, c=l.
Graph 7. Social welfare W(n) vs. P for n=4 and efficient one.
List 1. Computer Program.
2.3
graph 1 : primary incentive parameter for n==l,2,3,4
i^,o(4)
^i,o(2)
graph 2 : quantities for n=0,l,2,3,4
graph 3 prices for n=0,l,2,3,4
Pi(0)
/ Pi(l)
Pi(4)
graph 4 ; profits for n=0,l,2,3,4
7ti(0)
/ ^i(l)
7i:i(4)
graph. 5: welfare for efficient, n=0,l,2,3,4


L is t  1: X M A P L E  c o m p u t e r  p r o g r a m
n:=4;{for delegation chain length 4}
pl:=(a*(l+b)-xl-b*x2)/(l-b'^2);{inverse demand functions of each firm} 
p2:=(a*(l+b)-x2-b*xl)/( 1 -b^2);
prl[n]:=(pl-ll[n-l]*c)*xl;{maximands of the n+ l’th stage) 
pr2[n]:=(p2-12[n-l]*c)=>=x2;
assign(solve({diff(pr 1 [n],x 1 )=0,diff(pi'2[n],x2)=0},{x 1 ,x2)));{solve for 
Nash eq. of n+ l’th stage}
for i from n-1 by -1 to 1 do {solve for Nash eq. of stages 2 to n} 
prl[i]:=(pl-ll [i-l]*c)*xl; (maximands of stage i} 
pr2[i]:=(p2-12fi-l]*c)*x2;
assign(solve( {diff(pr 1 [i],l 1 [i])=0,diff(pr2[i],12[i])=0}, {11 [i],12[i]})) (solve 
for Nash eq. of stage i} 
od;
prl[0]:=fpl-c)*x 1 ;{maximands of 1st stage} 
pr2[0];=(p2-c)*x2;
assign(solve({diff(prl[0],ll[0])=0,diff(pr2[0],12[0])=0},{ll[0],12[0]})); 
{solve for Nash eq. of 1st stage}
factor(l 1 [0]);{factor out primary incejitive parameter, quantity, price, profit}
factor(xl);
fector(pl);
factor(prl);
